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Abstract 
From the late 1950s, as independent African polities replaced formal colonial rule in 
Africa, South Africa’s white minority regime set about its own policy of mimicry in 
the promotion of self-governing homelands, which were to be guided to full 
‘independence’.  Scholarly study of South Africa’s homelands has remained largely 
apart from accounts of decolonisation in Africa.  An interpretation of South Africa’s 
exceptional political path in the era of African decolonisation that has dominated the 
literature has meant that important debates in African history, which might helpfully 
illuminate the South African case, have been neglected.  In seeking inspiration for 
new histories of the homelands, this paper looks beyond South Africa’s borders to 
processes of and debates on decolonisation in Africa.  Historical accounts of African 
decolonisation, particularly the work of Frederick Cooper, provide inspiration for 
ways of thinking about the making of bantustan states, the production of power, the 
differentiated responses with which the bantustan project was met across localities, 
classes, genders and generations and the range of alliances that this process forged. 
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Introduction 
The current renewal of interest in the history of South Africa’s homelands, represented by the 
recent conference from which this special issue is drawn, is a welcome turn in South African 
historiography; indeed, it is long overdue.
1
  As historians seek new ways of approaching 
analyses of the bantustans and their related histories, circumspection and reflection on the 
theoretical underpinnings of such a project are imperative.
2
  This paper offers some thoughts 
for writing new histories of the homelands.  In seeking ways to approach these histories, the 
paper argues for deeper engagement with wider historiographies on Africa and highlights the 
importance of looking beyond the borders of the South African Republic (including its 
bantustans) in order to understand the historical dynamics of ‘separate development’ within 
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 ‘Let’s Talk About Bantustans’ Conference, NRF Chair in ‘Local Histories and Present Realities’ (with History 
Workshop), Hofmeyr House, University of the Witwatersrand, 15
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 In the historical period under discussion, the terms ‘bantustan’ and ‘homeland’ were often employed 
interchangeably by policy makers and administrators.  However, the term ‘bantustan’ (meaning ‘Bantu state’) 
has been often used pejoratively by scholars and activists, with reference to the ‘stans’ created in the course of 
the partition of India in 1947 and to the Soviet satellite states.  This paper follows such usage.  Although the 
paper refrains from the use of inverted commas in making reference to ‘homelands’, it does not accept the logic 
contained in this term: that all black South Africans had homes in, or ‘ethnic’ connections, to such rural areas. 
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the country.  Following a discussion of some of the literature on bantustans, the paper briefly 
explores the regional context within which South Africa’s policy of ‘independent’ homelands 
developed with particular reference to the High Commission Territories (HCTs; former 
Bechuanaland, Basotholand, Swaziland).
3
  Having done so, the paper looks for theoretical 
and methodological inspiration to a wider historiography on decolonisation and related 
processes in Africa.  This literature, it is argued, offers some important insights for writing 
new histories of the homelands and points to methods that might assist historians to better 
understand the range of local responses that bantustan policies engendered and the local 
terrains of power and politics through which these regimes were constituted.  A brief 
discussion of research on resettlement in the Ciskei helps to illustrate the utility of these 
approaches. 
 
African decolonisation and the bantustans 
By the 1950s, colonial governments in Africa were seeking to augment their formal 
relationships with colonies in response to the political challenges propelled by the changes of 
the Second World War.  Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, many former European colonies 
emerged as new and ‘independent’ states across the African continent.  Meanwhile, in South 
Africa, a white settler polity independent from Britain since 1910, the ruling National Party 
(NP) sought in this same period to extend existing patterns of colonial segregation through 
the devolution of political structures and the promotion of a putative independence in the 
African reserves.
4
  In the context of rapid urbanisation after the Second World War, in 
response to the ongoing demands of industrialists and commercial farmers for cheap labour, 
and facing increasingly militant challenges to the system by the oppressed majority, the NP 
sought to tighten and extend existing systems of ‘influx control’ designed to prevent the 
movement of black people to urban areas. 
Following intense debate throughout the 1950s, and in the wake of the 1960 
Sharpeville massacre, the question of influx control crystallised in the early years of the 
1960s, resulting in the ‘endorsement out’ and forced removal of thousands of Africans from 
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 Modern-day Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
4
 Colonial rule in apartheid South Africa has been regarded as distinct from the forms of rule in other British and 
French Colonies, where colonial regimes, from the 1940s, encouraged the ‘stabilisation’ of a ‘modern’, urban 
class of Africans.  F. Cooper, Africa Since 1940: the past of the present (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), pp. 57- 58.  For an account of the evolution of colonial policy in South Africa during the apartheid 
period, see, for example, I. Evans, Bureaucracy and Race: native administration in South Africa (London: 
University of California Press, 1997). 
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urban areas to the reserves, or homelands/ bantustans as these areas were to become known.
5
  
Britain’s announcement of its intentions to guide the HCTs to independence was soon 
followed by South Africa’s 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, which paved the 
way for the transformation of the ‘native’ reserves into self-governing homelands and recast 
colonial labour controls in national terms.  According to this formulation, which had been 
earlier elaborated in Tomlinson’s 1955 Report on the economic viability of the reserves, 
black residents of the Republic were to be domiciled in the ethnic homeland of their supposed 
‘origin’ where they were to possess ‘citizenship’.6  These territories would be guided towards 
independence by the white South African government.
7
  Like many cases of decolonisation, 
this bantustan project involved the devolution of control over state services and 
infrastructural projects, and the advancement – though more in image than in material terms - 
of the ‘national’ economies of the homelands through ‘border’, later homeland, industrial 
programmes.
8
  In line with policies for the promotion of self-government in ten such ethnic 
bantustans, between 1976 and 1981 four of these were granted independent status by South 
Africa (Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, Ciskei).  These states were never formally 
recognised on the international stage, owing to developing anti-apartheid geo-politics. 
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 Although Hendrik Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs, rejected Tomlinson’s recommendations that land 
purchase and major investment in the reserves were necessary for their economic viability, the principles of 
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document.  P. Delius, A Lion Amongst the Cattle: reconstruction and resistance in the northern Transvaal 
(Oxford: James Currey, 1996), p. 140.  H. Houghton, The Tomlinson Report: a summary of the findings and 
recommendations in the Tomlinson Commission Report (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race 
Relations, 1956). 
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 Harold Wolpe described this process as the ‘modernisation’ of the migrant labour system.  By the mid-
twentieth century, reserve agriculture could no longer sustain rural subsistence to subsidise the cost of social 
reproduction.  Tightened influx controls and political repression thus became necessary to sustain the system of 
cheap labour power, Wolpe argued.  H. Wolpe, ‘Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power: from segregation to 
apartheid’, Economy and Society 1:4 (1972), pp. 425- 56.  The ‘articulation of means of production’ approach 
has, however, been subject to wide critique.  Bridget O’Laughlin has described the ‘four main points to this 
critique: first, that structuralist approaches reduced gender to class; second, that they minimised the importance 
and complexity of rural differentiation; third, that they ignored regional specificity, and fourth, that they 
imposed a rigid teleological model of proletarianisation.’  B. O’Laughlin, ‘Missing Men? The debate over rural 
poverty and women-headed households in southern Africa’, Journal of Peasant Studies 25:2 (1998), p. 6. 
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 P. Wellings and A. Black, ‘Industrial Decentralization Under Apartheid: the relocation of industry to the South 
African periphery’, World Development 14:1 (1986), pp 1- 38; A. Hirsch, ‘Bantustan Industrialization with 
specific reference to the Ciskei, 1973-1981’ (M.A. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1984). 
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Contemporary commentators on South Africa’s bantustans highlighted the context of 
African decolonisation that had shaped and propelled the promotion of independent 
homelands in South Africa.  In their study of the Transkei, which was to be the white 
government’s example of homeland independence and the first bantustan to undergo the 
establishment of self-governing parliamentary structures, Gwendolen Carter, Thomas Karis 
and Newell Stultz noted the comparable process of Britain’s promotion of independence for 
the HCTs and highlighted the significance of developments in South-West Africa (today’s 
Namibia) in shaping the timing of the South African government’s promotion of homeland 
independence.
9
  Roger Southall situated the bantustan project in relation to the HCTs in his 
critique of South Africa’s ‘neo-colonial’ policy through which the white government sought 
to create a ‘commonwealth composed of a white core and black peripheral states’.  The 
promotion of independence in these Territories ‘demonstrated the feasibility of separate 
development’ to the South African government and, potentially, to the government’s 
international audience, Southall argued.
10
 
However, despite the recognition of the role of processes of African decolonisation in 
shaping South African homeland policy, comparisons between the bantustans and African 
decolonisation have most often demonstrated the exceptionalism of the South African case.  
In so doing, many authors have echoed the logic contained in the South African Communist 
Party’s explanation that South Africa represented a ‘special type’ of colonialism whereby 
‘[n]on-white South Africa [was] the colony of white South Africa itself.’11  Nolutshungu, for 
example, highlighted the significantly different nature of South Africa’s political trajectory in 
comparison to processes of decolonisation elsewhere on the continent.
12
  Although Southall’s 
influential political economy of Transkei independence significantly furthered scholarly 
understanding of the processes underway in this region, his account also aligned with the 
‘special type’ theory, emphasising the different ‘decolonising’ trajectories of the HCTs and 
the homelands and, consequently, their ‘qualitatively’ different relationships with the South 
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 G. M. Carter, T. Karis and N. M. Stultz, South Africa's Transkei: the politics of domestic colonialism (London: 
Heineman, 1967), pp. xii, 12-14, 91, 124. 
10
 R. Southall, South Africa’s Transkei: the political economy of an ‘independent’ bantustan (London: 
Heinemann, 1982), pp. 46, 54. 
11
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African state.  South Africa could not, he argued, be considered a colonial state comparable 
with Britain or France.
13
   
More recently, scholars have argued for the inclusion of South Africa in the historical 
narrative of decolonisation.  Identifying the absence of Britain’s dominions (Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) in the study of decolonisation, Tony Hopkins 
explores the end of these territories’ ‘long-established connections’ with Britain and their 
assumption of distinct national identities after the Second World War.
14
  Christopher 
Saunders has traced the late and lengthy decolonisation of Namibia and South Africa, to 
rectify the exclusion of these states from historical narratives of decolonisation.
15
  Both of 
these accounts identify the moment of ‘true’ decolonisation for South Africa in 1994, 
highlighting as exceptional South Africa’s late decolonisation.  Like much of the literature, 
Hopkins regards South African apartheid as the ‘extreme’ and exceptional case among the 
dominions, highlighting the pursuit of segregation in contrast with other of the dominions 
where policies of assimilation and, later, pluralism were adopted.
16
  South Africa’s promotion 
of independent homelands and the connections between this policy and processes of 
decolonisation elsewhere are given limited space in these accounts: Saunders’ article 
dedicates two paragraphs to this issue and Hopkins makes no reference at all.
17
  These 
perspectives can be identified in other influential literature on African decolonisation.
18
 
Although Southall identified the bantustans and HCTs as representing different 
typologies of post-colonial, or neo-colonial relations, resulting from the different processes 
through which South Africa and Britain led these territories to independence, the 
argumentation used to identify South Africa’s exceptionalism may be subject to critique.19  
While an account of the comparison between the HCTs and the bantustans deserves closer 
scrutiny than can be provided here, some brief evidence is revealing of the rather more close 
associations between the two than Southall’s account might suggest.  The discussion below, 
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 Southall, South Africa’s Transkei, p.10. 
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 A. G. Hopkins, ‘Rethinking decolonization’, Past & Present, 200 (2008), pp. 211-247, 215. 
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 C. Saunders, ‘The Transitions from Apartheid to Democracy in Namibia and South Africa in the Context of 
Decolonisation’, Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 1:1 (2000), pp. 1- 17. 
16
 Hopkins, ‘Rethinking Decolonization’, pp. 222- 224. 
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 In Frederick Cooper’s key account of African decolonisation, South Africa enters the story as an aberration to 
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occurring in 1994. Cooper, Africa Since 1940, pp. 53-58; 144-155. 
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 Southall, South Africa’s Transkei, p. 10. 
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which is necessarily incomplete but nevertheless illuminating, represents just one dimension 
of an understudied field.
20
 
The ongoing dispute over the transfer to South Africa of the HCTs had been the 
source of deepening discord with Britain since the Act of Union.
21
  South Africa had long 
expected that the HCTs would come into its official political orbit.
22
  However, with the 
election of the Afrikaner nationalists in 1948, and in the context of anti-colonial struggles and 
growing international hostility to the apartheid regime, by the end of the 1950s it had become 
clear that incorporation was no longer a viable option.
23
  As Britain launched the process of 
guiding the Territories from self-government to independence, in South Africa a policy of 
mimicry was commenced that would ‘modernise’ existing patterns of segregation through the 
development of ethnic national units in which black South Africans might exercise 
‘democratic’ rights and ‘national sovereignty’.  South Africa’s subsequent withdrawal from 
the Commonwealth (1961) paved the way for a policy of tightened control over the 
movements of the black population that was framed in starkly national terms.
24
   
Comparisons between the bantustans and the Territories were frequently invoked by 
apartheid ‘visionaries’ as the government pressed for homeland independence.25  Such 
comparisons were drawn between Lesotho and Transkei in particular: Transkei being the 
largest contiguous reserve area integrated, like landlocked Lesotho, within South Africa’s 
economy and migrant labour system.
26
  In a 1963 speech, Verwoerd reiterated that, should 
South Africa ‘become the guardian, protector or helper’ of the HCTs, that they would be 
subject to the same policies of the racial ‘consolidation’ of land and of border industries, as 
                                                          
20
 For example, the question of South Africa’s short-lived bantustan policy in South West Africa constitutes a 
central part of the story of the bantustans and that of decolonisation in southern Africa. Under South African 
mandate, and following the Odendaal Commission, ten ‘self-governing’ areas were established in South West 
Africa, three of which were granted ‘independence’: Ovamboland, Kavangoland and East Caprivi.  A. A. 
D’Amato, ‘The Bantustan Proposals from South-West Africa’, Journal of Modern African Studies 4:2 (1966), 
pp. 177- 192.  By the mid-1970s, this policy had been abandoned.  Saunders, ‘The Transitions’, p. 11. 
21
 R. Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, 1808-1948 (London: Macmillan, 1972). 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 R. Hyam and P. Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp. 102- 117; D. E. Torrance, ‘Britain, South Africa and the 
High Commission Territories: an old controversy revisited’, Historical Journal 41:3 (1998), pp. 751- 72. 
24
 R. Hyam, ‘The Parting of the Ways: Britain and South Africa’s departure from the Commonwealth’, Journal 
of Imperial and Commonwealth Studies 26:2 (1998), pp. 157- 175. 
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were being implemented in the bantustans.
27
  Yet while Lesotho’s independent status was 
rarely subject to challenge on national grounds and its accession to statehood was received as 
a ‘routine decolonisation’, Transkei failed to gain international recognition and became the 
subject of impassioned attacks by African nationalists and sympathetic parties as ‘the greatest 
single fraud ever invented by white politicians.’28  As James Ferguson has pointed out, the 
failure of the South African government to gain international recognition for homeland 
independence was ‘not always obvious or inevitable’.29  Although the South African 
government’s investment in the  economic development of the homelands was limited, the 
government having rejected the Tomlinson Commission’s recommendations for heavy 
investment in reserve employment in favour of mass resettlement and a minimised version of 
economic improvement,
30
 the levels of funding made available to self-governing Transkei (by 
South Africa) and Lesotho (by Britain) were not so wildly incomparable, and their respective 
agendas for the maintenance of investment opportunities similar.
31
 
More revealing than the ‘typologies’ approach criticised above is one that details and 
interrogates the relationships of imperialism (between colonial states and dependent 
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Republic of South Africa, Interdepartmental Committee of Inquiry into 
Foreign Bantu - Froneman Report (Pretoria: Government Printers, 1962), p. 179. 
28 Ferguson, ‘Paradoxes’, pp. 127; S. Biko, I Write What I Like (1978), cited in Ferguson, ‘Paradoxes’, pp. 131; 
G. Mbeki, South Africa: the peasants’ revolt (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964). 
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30
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Development in Southern Africa: British aid to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (London: Croon Helm, 
1977), p. 190. 
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territories), their character and historical trajectory, and assesses the meanings and 
significances of decolonisation in this frame. The arguments of Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald 
Robinson, who have traced the role of American free trade (or, rather, global capitalism) and 
the ‘[exchange] of formal control for informal tutelage’ in Britain’s retreat from formal 
empire, calling this the ‘imperialism of decolonisation’, provide a helpful way of framing a 
potential comparison between the homelands and HCTs by casting focus on the changing 
nature of imperial relationships in these concrete circumstances.
32
 
This leads to a second critique of the ‘exceptionalist’ argument.  Literature on 
decolonisation in Africa has often focused on processes by which formal political power was 
ceded by colonial regimes to African national governments.  Such accounts have understood 
decolonisation as referring to the actions and intents of colonial governments. John 
Hargreaves, for instance, defined decolonisation as the ‘measures intended eventually to 
terminate formal political control over colonial territories and to replace it by some new 
relationship.’33  Where studies that have placed greater emphasis on the roles that Africans 
played in the augmentation of colonial power, the term decolonisation has been usually 
employed to refer to the moment of the removal of formal colonial rule and the 
democratisation of national politics.
34
  Understood in these terms, South Africa experienced 
the latest decolonisation across the whole continent, with the advent of majority rule in 
1994.
35
  The present account finds sympathy with Marxist-inflected interpretations that 
highlight how bantustan policy reproduced longstanding systems of political oppression and 
labour control, ‘modernising’ a system of segregation designed to produce cheap labour by 
controlling the movements and urbanisation of the black population and the growing numbers 
of people who became ‘surplus’ to the needs of capitalist accumulation.36  However, it may 
be argued that the frame of analysis in which decolonisation in South Africa is understood 
only in terms of its ‘true’ accession to democratic statehood in 1994 offers a limited set of 
possibilities for extending historical knowledge. 
 The concept of decolonisation just outlined presents two problems.  Firstly, the linear 
notion of decolonisation – conceived as an endpoint or transition involving the attainment of 
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‘true’ independence (i.e. that recognised internationally) – neglects the role of historical 
possibilities and contingencies.  As Ferguson has shown, making distinctions between ‘real’ 
and ‘pseudo’ nation states is highly problematic: what came to be considered ‘real’ 
independence on the international stage was not inevitable, but rather the contingent result of 
specific historical and political processes.
37
  Secondly, conceiving decolonisation as a 
political process through which independent national states were created, and analysing such 
shifts at the level of national politics, or in terms of interactions with the former metropole, 
may lead to the neglect of a range of local-level and transnational dynamics. 
How then might decolonisation be better conceived for the purposes of finding new 
tools to study historical change in, and in relation to, the homelands?  Insights may be gained 
by problematising decolonisation as a moment of political flux.  Decolonisation might be 
used not only as a term to denote a particular pattern of political change but to describe a 
period – in the case of the bantustans the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, prior to the 
turbulence of the subsequent decade and during which time homeland independence was 
being fiercely promoted - in which state institutions, their matrices of power and their local 
meanings, were being rapidly altered.  Seen in this frame, the South African government’s 
project to create independent homelands with devolved state structures might be productively 
compared with shifts elsewhere in Africa. 
 Insights from research on processes of decolonisation in Africa are discussed in detail 
below.  There is, however, a South African literature on class relations in the homelands that 
provides a central foundation for the intellectual projects proposed in this paper.  Scholarly 
commentators of Transkei’s independence, such as Southall, Duncan Innes and Dan 
O’Meara, influenced by the lively revisionist endeavour of the late 1970s to reinterpret South 
African society through the lens of Marxist political economy, focused on an analysis of the 
class dynamics of homeland independence and the opportunities that this process fostered for 
political control and capital accumulation by new and existing elites.  This research provided 
important insights that showed how the promotion of self-government in the Transkei, and 
the decentralisation of control over state resources and creation of a new civil service that this 
involved, created opportunities for local black elites to ‘collaborate’ and gain a stake in a 
system that was geared ultimately towards the enrichment of white capital and the white 
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minority.
38
  These accounts emphasised the importance of macro and systemic analyses of the 
bantustans in the context of South African capitalism and depicted the bantustan regimes as 
primarily the result of top-town imposition by the South African government.   
Southall argued that even if the homelands could not satisfy the aspirations of the 
majority of black people in South Africa, they were, in the mid-1970s, ‘assuming a 
momentum and dynamism of their own which could serve to stabilise and perpetuate white 
domination in South Africa.’39  Exploring this ‘dynamism’, Southall sought to ‘delineate the 
various social groups who may be viewed as benefiting from Transkeian “independence”’.40  
The ‘principal beneficiaries of independence’ were, Southall argued, ‘the Transkeian 
bourgeoisie [‘chiefs, politicians, and bureaucrats, and a group of petty traders and 
businessmen’], international capital and, ultimately, the South African Government.’41  
Southall highlighted the formation of a class alliance among an expanded Transkeian state 
‘salariat’ (which included civil servants of various ranks and a growing group of chiefs and 
headmen) and the managerial classes tied to South African capital in the Transkei, which 
formed the support base for the Transkei National Independence Party (TNIP).
42
  If 
Transkei’s independence worked in the favour of these groups, by further subverting the 
labour and the political freedoms of the new polity’s residents, the system remained 
nevertheless illegitimate given the ‘indifference’ of urban voters in the Transkei, the majority 
of whom failed to register and whose voices were silenced in a system that privileged rural 
votes and forced urban dwellers to register in rural areas.
43
 
Innes and O’Meara, in their account of class formation in Transkei, highlighted the 
‘ambiguities’ present in the consciousness of the proletariat in this territory, which were 
shaped, they argued, by the ‘structure and relations of South African capitalism’.44  They 
highlighted the gulf between, on the one hand, proletarians’ understandings of their own 
oppression and, on the other, the structural conditions of capitalism and labour exploitation 
that lay at the root of these experiences.  Innes and O’Meara rightly highlighted the 
disjuncture between the material structures of exploitation and the perceptions of these (as 
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Bridget O’Laughlin has also argued for Mozambique).45  However, they ultimately concluded 
that the significance of Transkeian independence lay at the ‘level of the imperatives of South 
African capitalism, their mediation by the state, and the impact on the region’.46 
While the approaches of these authors hold fundamental importance for ongoing 
attempts to understand social relations in the homelands, new historical interest brings the 
opportunity to further interrogate and to better understand class relations and power dynamics 
and their change over time.  For all the major insights of his study, Southall neglected to 
explore the kinds of politics and circumstances that shaped rural support for TNIP: such 
support was explained in only brief terms with reference to coercion, patronage, vote rigging 
and illiteracy in rural areas.
47
  While Southall highlighted widespread dissent, he also 
skimmed over other forms of engagement with the bantustan state.  Thus although his 
account provides a coherent account of the ruling class in Transkei at the moment of 
independence, it does not offer a satisfactory analysis of state power and its production in 
relation to the diverse and disaggregated interest groups affected by the processes associated 
with homeland independence.  Innes and O’Meara argued that ‘[t]he real changes’ introduced 
by Transkeian independence ‘should be situated within the determining context, i.e. the 
imperatives of South African capitalism’.48  To this extent, they attributed little importance to 
understanding local dynamics of politics and power and to their meanings.  Like Southall, 
their main focus was on a ‘collaborationist bourgeoisie’. 
In their endeavours to highlight the functions served by the homelands system to 
South African capitalism, these accounts overlooked the agency of African people in shaping 
state institutions and governance and in stretching the limits of official power, not only 
through active resistance but through a variety of other modes of engagement.
49
  Identifying 
and understanding refusals to engage with homeland politics, or highlighting secessionist 
movements that sought escape homeland rule by allying with alternative political formations- 
as for example Southall highlights in the attempts of Transkei residents to form alliances with 
Lesotho and Qwaqwa,
50
 will of course continue to be important projects for historical 
research.  Yet a venture of equal importance to historians must also be found in trying to 
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understand with what other responses the homeland system was met, and to appreciate the 
circumstances in which rural elites were able to foster the networks of patronage that are so 
often referred to but remain little understood.
51
  Exploring the modes and effects of the 
distribution of state resources (pensions, education, land, housing, labour contracts, for 
example), however limited, as well as the meanings and politics associated with such 
processes, is central to any discussion of power in the bantustans.  There is a need for 
renewed attention to the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, during which time the state 
structures of the bantustans were reconfigured.  It was in this period that the NP government, 
through the extensive programmes of the Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development (BAD),
52
 supported by not inconsiderable state financing,
53
 undertook a 
restructuring of the institutions and practices of state in the reserves as part of its project of 
‘separate development’.  Without interrogating the content, the meanings and the historical 
dynamics of these programmes (of housing, education, industrial development and so on), 
which constituted the social terrain on which bantustan states were built, it remains 
impossible to understand the evolution of political resistance to homeland regimes and their 
eventual collapse. 
The endeavours of social historians to reveal and understand local responses to the 
development of capitalism and the colonial state in twentieth century South Africa provide 
historians with a rich tradition and strong platform from which to undertake new research on 
the homelands.  Nevertheless, there is a need to critically reflect on approaches to social 
history and some of the limitations of previous approaches in embarking on new studies.  In 
the late 1980s, Mike Morris and Martin Murray criticised the ways in which South African 
social historians tended to emphasise popular identity over materialist analysis and often 
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juxtaposed ‘the state’ and popular ‘resistance’ in problematic ways.54  Directing his attack at 
the work of Tim Keegan particularly, Murray pointed to the ways that the ‘new’ social 
history of the 1980s tended to privilege social divisions of race over those of class, and to 
over-emphasise levels of social cohesion among black rural dwellers.
55
  He argued that the 
representation of rural African peoples as ‘coherent, homogeneous social entities linked 
together through similar experiences, common cultural bonds, and shared convictions’ was 
not only prone to sentimentality, but also overstated the coherence of a group divided by class 
and gender.
56
  Furthermore, Murray’s critique continued, this dominant mode of 
representation overemphasised the strength and resilience of ‘popular struggles’ against 
agrarian capitalism and overplayed the extent to which these struggles were characterised by 
expressions of anti-capitalist or anti-colonial sentiment.
57
  Although these critiques lumped 
together, perhaps unfairly, a wide variety of accounts - a number of which were thoroughly 
informed by class analysis - such critiques do highlight the problem of what Cooper has 
called ‘autonomist’ accounts of popular anti-colonial sentiment.58  They highlight the need to 
question what, in fact, historians mean when they identify ‘resistance’, and highlight the 
imperative among historians to be wary of metanarratives that ‘tidy up’ and rationalise 
uneven responses to   concrete circumstances, actions that may or may not have been shaped 
by identification with, or against, a political movement or ideology. 
 
Differentiated responses to decolonisation in Africa 
In the context of decolonisation in French and British Africa, Cooper has argued, ‘different 
groups within colonies mobilized for concrete ends and used as well as opposed the 
institutions of the colonial state and the niches opened up in the clash of old and new 
structures’.59  This formulation is helpful for thinking about the making of South Africa’s 
homelands.  Responses to decolonisation cannot be read off from, or reduced to, a narrative 
of ‘oppression’ or ‘collaboration’ versus ‘resistance’: whether or not the strategic actions of 
                                                          
54
 M. Morris, ‘Social History and the Transition to Capitalism in the South African Countryside’, Review of 
African Political Economy 41 (1988), pp. 60- 72; M. J. Murray, ‘The Origins of Agrarian Capitalism in South 
Africa: a critique of the “social history” perspective’, Journal of Southern African Studies 15:4 (1989), pp. 645- 
65.  For a discussion of the juxtaposition of ‘state’ vs ‘women’, see L. Manicom, ‘Ruling Relations: rethinking 
state and gender in South African history’, Journal of African History 33:3 (1992), pp. 441- 465. 
55
 Murray, ‘Origins of Agrarian Capitalism’, pp. 648- 649. 
56
 Ibid. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Cooper, ‘Conflict and Connection’, p. 1525. 
59
 F. Cooper, ‘The Dialectics of Decolonization: nationalism and labor movements in post-war French Africa’, 
in F. Cooper and A. Stoler (eds), Tensions of Empire: colonial cultures in a bourgeois world (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), p. 406. 
14 
 
individuals and groups fed into the activities and agendas of nationalist organisations ‘needs 
to be investigated, not assumed.’60  It is a task for historians to understand who these ‘groups’ 
were, how they were constituted, for what ‘ends’ and with what effects, as they engaged with 
these ‘old and new’ structures of state and power. 
Historiographies in modern African history have for more than two decades sought to 
move beyond paradigms of ‘nationalist’ history that dominated in the years following 
independence, which identified closely with and legitimated the successes of nationalist 
movements.
61
  Alongside a wide range of scholarly articles, edited volumes on Kenya, 
Zimbabwe and Zambia have probed the competing visions of independence, the 
contradictions between different local concerns and national agendas and the ambiguous 
inheritances of post-colonial contexts.
62
 
In these accounts, select examples of which are discussed below, analyses of gender, 
class and generation have proved key in understanding how responses to political change and 
state intervention were differentiated in the decolonising ‘moment’.  This literature highlights 
in helpful ways the strategic alliances formed by and among those marginalised in societies 
dominated by senior men, particularly women and junior men.  The following section elicits 
some of the key theoretical and methodological issues arising from this literature that are of 
concern for studying histories of the homelands. 
Debates in the history of the Zimbabwean liberation war highlight the need to 
understand in nuanced terms the local politics of the liberation struggle and the nature of 
social relationships between guerrillas and differentiated local populations.  In criticism of 
Terence Ranger’s tale of ‘peasant consciousness’ in the Zimbabwean liberation war, which 
posited a widespread ideological commitment among civilians to nationalist guerrilla 
mobilisation, Norma Kriger contends that contingent, ‘non-nationalist, locally-centred 
interests’ were crucial in shaping both support for, and lack of co-operation with, ZANLA 
guerrillas.
63
  The liberation war, Kriger has argued, may best be understood as a set of 
‘struggles within the struggle’, a perspective that has been supported by subsequent 
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research.
64
  In its disruption of established rural power structures, the war presented 
opportunities for oppressed groups, particularly women and the young, to make beneficial 
changes to their circumstances through forming strategic alliances with the guerrillas: 
‘[u]nmarried peasant children challenged their elders, women battled their husbands ... and 
the least advantaged attacked the better off’, she argues.65  In the ‘enforced restructuring of 
rural communities’ propelled by the war, established practices governing gendered and 
generational relations were subject to challenge.  Young people, especially men, sought co-
operative alliances with the guerillas in order to subvert existing power hierarchies that were 
dominated by male elders.
66
  For young women the war presented opportunities to escape 
domestic drudgery and to explore new experiences with ‘heroic’ young men; the reordering 
of social space in the bush camps and protected villages allowed young women to wrest 
control over their own sexuality from male and female elders.
67
  But while Kriger highlighted 
the high levels of coercion and violence underpinning the success of guerrilla mobilisation,
68
 
David Maxwell has argued that ‘guerrillas worked out locally specific strategies to respond to 
the differing agendas they perceived amongst the peasantry.’69 
This literature exposes how the guerillas’ operations were shaped and limited by 
unequal and uneven rural social relations.  In the context of deeply divided gendered and 
generational relations, the war exposed social cleavages, opened up new social ‘spaces’ and 
allowed room for new alliances to be formed.  It presented opportunities for some to improve 
their social status and access to resources, while simultaneously challenging established 
power hierarchies.  The success of the guerillas’ efforts to establish local regimes of power 
rested on their ability to play these local politics and power relations to their advantage.  
These insights help to elicit new points of inquiry for the homelands:  they point to the need 
to interrogate the limits of local power regimes, and the roles of local social relations, uneven 
as they were, in shaping the form, content and production of state power in its various guises. 
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Social cleavages - particularly the widely marginalised status of rural women - shaped 
the formation of formal political alliances in the decolonising ‘moment’.  Marc Epprecht has 
argued that in late colonial Lesotho, women’s apparent political ‘conservatism’ in their 
support for the Basutoland National Party (BNP), which was formed by chiefs (and supported 
by the Catholic church) in opposition to the more ‘radical’ Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), 
had little to do with either political passivity or naïvety.  Instead, such tendencies stemmed 
from the ambiguous political spaces women were inclined to enter into in order to articulate 
their grievances and to find strategic ways of protecting their interests.
70
  For example, the 
Catholic church, ‘ostensibly conservative’ as it was, offered spiritual refuge and livelihood 
opportunities for young women seeking escape from rural patriarchy.
71
  Women chiefs, in the 
earliest public role to be opened to women in Lesotho, tended to act in the name of custom in 
order to resist the detrimental material impacts of rural ‘improvement schemes’ that were so 
unpopular among peasants.
72
  In the context of male migrant absenteeism, patriarchal styles 
of chieftainship were gradually adapted to encompass greater consideration of women’s 
complaints, in particular the defence of their right to brew and sell beer.  The protection of 
women’s livelihoods remained in the material interests of chiefs, lest they be burdened with 
the responsibility of support of the poor.
73
  Furthermore, ‘radical’, ‘modern’ and 
‘progressive’ politics claimed by the BCP were more so in name than in substance, as these 
factions professed gender equality while also eschewing prejudice against assertive female 
behaviour.
74
  This research highlights key questions that need to be asked of the history of 
homeland politics: how, when and why did women (and young people, if we are to 
incorporate insights from the Zimbabwean literature) align themselves with particular 
political parties and formations in the homelands; with what effects; and how can these 
alliances be located in the material context of unequal and dynamic social relations? 
 Literatures on the local reception of rural state interventions remain important stimuli 
for further research on the homelands.  Priya Lal, for example, has recently explored the 
limits of state power in the implementation of ujamaa in postcolonial Tanzania.
75
  Her 
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account shows how the practices of rural people rarely conformed to the gendered 
constructions of family that underpinned ujamaa ideology and policy.  Instead, rural men and 
women who were the targets of villagisation policy sought to engage with the project of 
ujamaa in ‘ways that maximised their own self-interest.’76  In the ideologies of ujamaa, the 
responsibilities of rural men and women in the revolutionary project were distinct: young 
men were charged with responsibility for the militant defence of the new nation through the 
enforcement of villagisation, while women’s contribution to nation-building was to be as 
‘devoted mothers’ ‘both of [their] own children and by extension of the nation as a whole.’77  
Nevertheless, in practice, young men and women (as in Kriger’s case), made strategic 
alliances and employed concepts of security and self-reliance in selective ways, in 
accordance with their own needs and circumstances and in relation to enduring practices of 
livelihood and association.  Where young men complied with official orders to enforce 
resettlement, this was often with a view to maximising their own status and independence in 
relation to male elders.
78
  The nuclear family at the centre of ujamaa’s ideological project, for 
which women were charged with the responsibilities of care and reproduction, proved a 
smokescreen for the endurance of historical and flexible familial arrangements, as individuals 
‘approached family as a contingent social resource and survival strategy, and formed and 
dissolved marital and kinship alliances’ in response to their own needs for security.79 
In thinking about responses to state development interventions there is, of course, a 
comparable literature on the impacts of and responses to so-called ‘betterment’ measures in 
the South African reserves during the 1950s.
80
  Local relations with chiefs were heavily 
shaped by their association with these programmes, which involved fencing, relocation, land 
reallocation and stock limitation and impinged materially, and often dramatically, on the lives 
of rural people.
81
  Yet the responses of those affected by betterment planning were cut across 
starkly by gender and generation, as Anne Mager has shown.  Mobilisation against 
betterment in the Ciskei reserves was marked by changing generational masculinities.  Older 
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men had mobilised around the threat posed by stock limitation on their abilities to fulfil 
dominant constructions of masculinity through owning and extending their cattle holdings.  
However, in the context of the transformation of patriarchal power which saw young 
migrants’ status improve and older men become dependent on their wages, by the mid-1950s 
younger men, denied opportunities to establish themselves as cattle owners and land holders, 
sought to reconfigure patriarchal discourse in the language of African nationalism.
82
  In 
contrast, rural women in the vicinity of the Ciskei, marginalised and impoverished in a 
patriarchal society and a labour market dominated by men, saw moving onto land owned by 
the South African Native Trust not simply as an act of ‘collaboration’, as those opposed to 
betterment may have perceived, but as a viable strategy to improve their livelihoods: 
If collaboration with the Trust meant access to land, if co-operation with the authorities 
allowed women to work, if acceptance of Trust regulations meant women could feed their 
children and retain their self-respect, then this was an option they would exercise.
83
 
In allocating land to single women, the Native Trust ‘undermined the domestic patriarchal 
order and strengthened the power of the state’ by forging positive relations with marginalised 
rural populations.
84
  There remains significant further scope for new investigations of state 
interventions in the bantustans in subsequent decades that employ this revealing and nuanced 
methodology to reveal the gendered processes through which state power was produced and 
reproduced. 
These accounts foreground the importance of locating differentiated local responses to 
decolonisation in all its various forms – liberation wars, political allegiances and state 
planning interventions – within analyses of historical and social change.  The emphasis they 
place upon the contingent material circumstances that shaped different responses to the 
realities of the decolonising ‘moment’, and the ways in which individuals pursued strategic 
means to ‘concrete ends’, offer crucial ways of reinterpreting acts otherwise understood as 
marking ‘collaboration’ or ‘resistance’.   By focusing on the dynamics of relations between 
nationalist organisations and differentiated local populations, and between such populations 
and the state, these approaches suggest new avenues for historical study of the homelands.  
They stress the importance of exploring shifting power relations and attempts to establish 
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local hegemonies, whether by militant political formations or by agents of the state, through 
prisms of gender, generation and class. 
The writings of Frederick Cooper, perhaps more than any other historian, present 
some crucial points of departure for thinking about histories of the homelands.  Although 
homeland regimes were crucially implicated as agents in the systems of control that had long 
promoted white supremacy, cheap labour and capital accumulation, the meanings and the 
outcomes of bantustan policy were neither clear cut nor static, and localised responses to 
these interventions were neither predictable nor even across time and place.  Cooper has 
shown how the coming of independence in west Africa was characterised by ‘possibility and 
constraint’, as, in particular historical moments, various political options were opened up and 
closed down.
85
  ‘What gets lost in narrating history as the triumph of freedom... is a sense of 
process’, he argues.86  In seeking to understand the contingency of historical process in the 
coming of independence Cooper suggests that historians need to identify ‘moments of 
divergent possibilities, or different configurations of power, that open up and shut down’, and 
to ask ‘[j]ust how wide were those possibilities?  And how much did actions taken at any one 
of many conjunctures narrow trajectories and alternatives?’87 
In the case of the South African homelands, these formulations highlight the need to 
interrogate key moments that have been subsumed within highly politicised national 
narratives of oppression and resistance.  The promotion of independent homelands has been 
largely seen as a process driven from above by the South African government and 
opportunistic homeland elites, as a political shift that protected the intensification of labour 
exploitation, and as one that found little popular support from below.
88
  On the other hand, 
the ‘reunification’ of South Africa and the collapse of homeland administrations into national 
and provincial structures has been most commonly identified, it may be argued, as an 
outcome of successful popular struggle against the apartheid regime and its subsidiary 
homeland governments.  The object here is not simply to refute such explanations, but to 
subject them to critical scrutiny.  There were surely a range of uneven processes that played 
roles in the making – and undoing – of regimes of power and influence.  These processes 
cannot be understood in abstract terms; rather, they are constituted in the practice of local 
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policy and politics, and particularly in the allocation of resources, that shaped the relations 
formed between states and local people.
89
  Further research on these themes, in a range of 
different contexts, is imperative if deeper understandings of the homeland regimes are to be 
forged. 
A fundamental question is thus how to understand the historical evolution of the 
bantustan state and its practices in local contexts.  Cooper highlights the need to recognise the 
uneven and changing nature of indirect forms of chiefly rule, and suggests how other notions 
of political power and the ‘social contract’ played a role in shaping forms of governance 
across Africa in the post-war period.
90
  The power of homeland chiefs and officials – 
appointed and salaried by the white colonial state, often reliant on land allocation for local 
influence and possessing limited downward accountability – might be subject to further 
scrutiny around the ways in which such figures constituted their authority (or, indeed, failed 
to do so) in the coming of homeland ‘independence’ and thereafter.  Historians might ask, for 
example, what processes were implicated in the making of homeland authority and 
governance in highly populated bantustan areas, such as Ciskei or Qwaqwa, where chiefs had 
little land to allocate and thereby to establish structures of patronage.
91
  The role of ‘non-
agrarian’ resources controlled by the state – housing and residential sites, schooling, 
healthcare, pensions, access to migrant contracts, local business opportunities and 
employment – are little understood in terms of the role of these resources in forging relations 
and new political dynamics between the state and local people in the homelands.  The key 
analytical thread of Cooper’s work is this regard is the notion of the ‘gatekeeper state’: 
...strong at the point where ex-colonies meet international institutions... Developmentalist 
ideologies are crucial to the gatekeeper state, for they define the terms in which foreign aid is 
appealed for.  The gate faces inward as well and represents a potent source of jobs and 
patronage.  At the same time, local politicians cannot rest on their modernizing claims to 
authority or on the modern state’s patronage apparatus but must mobilize political support and 
clientage on a variety of fronts, in a variety of cultural idioms.  The gatekeeper’s alleged 
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modernity does not necessarily constitute a hegemonic ideology much beyond the site of the 
gatekeeper’s toll booth.92 
 
Postcolonial African states, like South Africa’s bantustans, inherited developmentalist 
ideologies and policies from the colonial past, and continued to be integrated in highly 
unequal, imperial relations that were sustained through such policy interventions.
93
  The state 
as gatekeeper presents a useful point of departure for seeking ways to better understand the 
making and the meaning of bantustan states, and the specific ways that elites mobilised 
political support and clientage at local levels.  As has been shown above, writing on the 
bantustans has hitherto focused on the fact of these structures of clientage, but has largely 
ignored the history of these and the idioms and local relations through which they were 
forged and practiced. 
This historiography on African decolonisation raises a set of questions that may help 
to frame new scholarship on South Africa’s homelands.  The emphases that Cooper, Kriger, 
Epprecht, Lal and others have placed on concrete, material circumstances and social 
inequalities lead us to question how, through projects that underpinned and accompanied 
homeland independence, relations between state structures and local people were constructed 
across a variety of contexts.  How, and in what terms, we might ask, did people call upon 
homeland regimes for access to state resources?
94
  Did homeland regimes manage to establish 
localised structures of hegemony, and if so, how were these constructed- both materially and 
discursively?  What contingent circumstances allowed bantustan state structures (however 
precarious and weak they may have been) to attain accommodation among some residents of 
the bantustans, and how were they challenged?  Such points of inquiry demand that 
‘citizenship’ – in terms of the ways that local relations were constituted around state 
resources – be taken seriously as an analytical problem. It may be instructive to draw 
connections between the homelands and other decolonising African contexts, in relation to 
the roles and effects of developmentalist policies pursued by late colonial and postcolonial 
states. 
95
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Farm dwellers and resettlement in the Ciskei 
A brief discussion of research on the resettlement of farm dwellers into rural townships in the 
Ciskei helps to elicit some of the arguments developed above.
96
  By the 1960s, farm labour in 
the Eastern Cape was widely proletarianised: few farm workers had access to land and 
payment was widely made in cash and food rations.  Farm workers and their families 
frequently left in protest against low wages and conditions, and went in search of better 
circumstances on other farms in the area.  The ‘squeeze’ upon farm households produced by 
agrarian capitalisation and state labour controls precipitated some crucial gendered and 
generational changes in rural society.  In turn, these changes had profound influences on the 
dynamics of resettlement: differential positions of gender and age fundamentally shaped 
experiences of resettlement from the farms. 
Although some of the people evicted from farms who resettled in the Ciskei lost 
livestock and access to land as a result of their eviction, and experienced great trauma in the 
process of resettlement, few of those who arrived in the late 1960s and early 1970s came 
solely as a result of the coercions of farmers and state labour inspectors.  Many resettled 
families, evicted from farms, had moved around for long periods of time in search of secure 
tenure.  With few other options, house and plot in the resettlement townships provided a 
secure base for migrant families and an opportunity to escape conflict with farmers over the 
labour of young migrant men.  Some young couples moved to the resettlement townships to 
set up their own homes.  Gaining access to education, to further efforts in migrant job-
seeking, was another consideration for parents and young people escaping the farms for the 
townships. 
Some young men, having long been migrant wage earners, sought access to better-
paying contracts via the labour bureaux that were close to resettlement townships, where their 
families could reside without having to fulfil the condition of farm residence by working for 
the farmer.  Moving the family from the farms to the resettlement areas, and thereby 
assuming responsibility for the care of elderly parents, represented for many migrant men the 
adoption of a dominant position in the household.  These migrants were also able to escape 
some of the greatest privations of life both on the farms and upon arrival in the resettlement 
areas.  In contrast, women and young men who had been permanent residents on farms prior 
to their resettlement faced constant threats of eviction from white landlords.  The end of 
degrading, undervalued and underpaid labour on the farms was for these people posed in 
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crucial relation to finding autonomy in the new townships.  Yet while leaving the farms may 
have brought a sense of spatial ‘liberation’ from landlords and from the tight control of farm 
life, this nevertheless went hand in hand with the greater economic exposure that came with 
extrication from the ‘softening’ aspects of paternalism, most notably rations.97   
The resettlement of farm workers proved a crucial dynamic in the making of state 
institutions and their influence at a local level.  As Jeff Peires has shown, in the context of the 
Ciskei’s land consolidation programme, resettlement enabled aspirant chiefs, by claiming 
‘ancestral’ land, to achieve territory and a base of patronage simultaneously.98  Although the 
resettlement townships of Sada and Ilinge were initially administered by the BAD, the 
resettlement of farm dwellers proved a similarly crucial dynamic in the making of local 
structures of state and authority.  In the context of the high demand for housing among farm 
workers and widespread deprivation in the resettlement areas, the state was able to forge 
structures of patronage and social control that deeply permeated the economy of the 
townships through the distribution of township housing, limited local employment and food 
rations through the local offices of the Department, which were adjudicated by township 
superintendents and known locally as the ‘Trust’.99 
The creation of local employment under the administration of the Department tied 
resettled people into webs of rent-paying, and created the basis for new relations between 
local people and state institutions.  Such regularised structures of dependency were both 
intricate and totalising.  Rent payment enhanced the gendered complex of control focused on 
the prevention of women’s permanent urbanisation.  By trapping resettled women into 
regular employment, and deducting rent from their wages, by binding households into rent 
payment on a lease-to-buy basis, and by tightly regulating the payment of rent, the utilisation 
of state resources served to reinforce migrant labour by preventing out-migration to the cities, 
except through regulated channels for male labour recruitment. 
These highly regulated structures were, in 1972, inherited by the new administration 
of the Ciskei bantustan, and became subject to new imperatives of political patronage.  For 
the period in which the Ciskei administration in the townships was able to allocate housing 
plots, and to distribute basic goods and access to migrant and local work contracts, the local 
regime was able to foster, albeit temporarily, a limited form of legitimacy amongst former 
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farm dwellers and other marginal groups newly resident in the Ciskei.  A number of farm 
dwellers described attitudes towards the Ciskei authorities that were rather less than hostile 
and were founded on a level of confidence in the Ciskei regime’s delivery of housing and 
basic services. 
In the light of similar evidence of farm dwellers’ resettlement experiences in other 
parts of the country, it seems likely that such dynamics might be identified in other of the 
homelands.
100
  While far from complete, this picture begins to suggest how the material 
conditions faced by farm dwellers and workers on commercial farmland created a set of 
circumstances in which resettlement opened up spaces of opportunity not only for aspirant 
chiefs but also for the poorest and most exploited inhabitants of the countryside who sought 
to find ways to better their migrant strategies.  This evidence demands that we think carefully 
about localised processes of resource allocation, whether through personal patronage or 
regularised policy, in the making of power relations and state structures in the bantustans.  
Evidence pointing to the gendered experiences of resettled farm dwellers’, while incomplete, 
points to further opportunities to examine gendered dynamics in the production of power and 
authority at local levels in the homelands. 
 
Conclusion 
In the recent past theoretical parallels between the bantustans and African decolonisation 
have been understandably rejected, given the pressing agenda to condemn oppressive 
homeland governments and the system of racial capitalism they were invested to protect.  In 
seeking inspiration for ways to better understand the creation of the homelands system, and in 
looking for tools to examine social relations and the production of power in this context, this 
paper has sought to connect the history of the bantustans with that of decolonisation 
elsewhere in Africa.  Literatures on the social history of Africa, which interrogate diverse 
aspects of the decolonising ‘moment’, encourage new ways of thinking about the South 
African government’s bantustan project, the making of these devolved state structures, the 
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experiences of people living in the homelands and the connections of these experiences to the 
construction and disintegration of power regimes in the bantustans.  Through a brief case 
study of resettlement in the Ciskei, the paper has sought to demonstrate how these approaches 
might be employed as part of a wider theoretical agenda to interrogate the history of the 
bantustans as institutions that, through the decentralisation of state resource provision and 
everyday practices of governance, forged new relations between state and local people with 
sometimes surprising outcomes.  These programmes fostered a range of different responses 
and alliances, and produced political outcomes, that only detailed historical inquiry can elicit. 
 
